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An examination of the different rules would yield similar results to those noticed above. We may say with Sidgwick: "No quality has ever been praised as excellent by mankind generally which cannot be shown to have some marked felicitic effect, and to be within proper limits obviously conducive to the general happiness."\* Or with Cicero who says: "How are such virtues as generosity, or love of country, or the desire to do good to your fellow-man, or gratitude possible? All of them spring from the fact that we are by nature impelled to love one another. This is the foundation of law!"

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## DISCUSSION.

### ETHICAL *versus* INTELLECTUAL IDEALISM.

PROFESSOR JOHN WATSON has, in his paper in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for July, 1899, set out very clearly and well the differences between current "Intellectual Idealism" and the new "Ethical Idealism." They each emphasize one set of elements without realizing how really similar in kind is the defect which they thus share in common.

The "ethical" idealism to which we prefer to ally ourselves is one in which Reason and Knowledge are certainly "the same in *kind*, though not in *extent*," as they are in God. We do not place any bar or limit to knowledge or man's receptiveness of the Divine, so "intellectual" at the same time is our idealism. Professor Watson belabors "ethical" idealism for its too exclusive stress on feeling and will, and fails to realize that he is in no better case because his "intellectual" idealism so magnifies knowledge or thought. He very properly says a true philosophy does not confine itself "to the intellectual side of man's nature, to the exclusion of the ethical and religious." But though in this,

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\* "Methods of Ethics," B. V. p. 489.

and very much else that he urges, we can cordially agree, he strangely fails to grapple with, or indeed even touch, the real objection to the Hegelian type of idealism with which he is identified, which, as is perfectly well known, is that it makes thought constitutive of reality instead of simply interpretative of it, and, in so doing, gives the categories of thought an unwarranted place in the interpretation of the Universe. Thought is for us also, in an important sense, the great reality, but the thought of man may not make or evolve the world of reality ; its function is to interpret the world as actually given to it ; the combining unity of Self-consciousness conditions that world of reality for us, but does not create it or impart to it objectivity. He tells us the indictment brought against "intellectual" idealism is its denial of the individuality, freedom, and moral responsibility of man. Why, then, did he not show that "ethical" idealism has no case, for that all these have unquestionable justice done to them by "intellectual" idealism? He makes attempt to show that "ethical" idealism mutilates the totality of experience which philosophy is called upon to interpret, but he ought to have vindicated "intellectual" idealism from the charge of mutilating in like manner, but in another direction. He cannot delude himself by thinking this has been done when it has been insisted that Philosophy is "intellectual" and deals with "truth." Philosophy may be as "intellectual" as he will, and yet may be perfectly capable of doing justice, in its intellectual treatment, to the "volitional and moral and social" aspects involved in the sphere of its thought and representation. The question is, Has "intellectual" idealism meted out such justice? "Ethical" idealism doubts it. Is its doubt justified? Professor Watson says Hegel "has not ignored feeling and will," and it may be granted that Hegel has said things that are good of spirit as will. But Professor Watson is too good a philosopher not to know that these things must be taken not by themselves, but as Hegel meant them to be taken, namely, in the light of the principles embedded in its theoretic system, since on these his treatment of the will is based. Besides, merely to say Hegel "has not ignored" feeling and will is a very lame way of meeting the assertion of "ethical" idealism that the volitional and moral elements receive in "intellectual" idealism a handling which is quite inadequate. It may be that Professor Caldwell is not cor-

rect—as Professor Watson says he is not correct—in calling “ethical” idealism an “application” of the older idealism to the solution of Life’s concrete problems : what is of far more importance is that a FULLER “application” is possible to a true idealism than any which has been made by “intellectual” idealism. Such drawing together, indeed, of the “intellectual” and the “ethical” lines of thought seems precisely the need of our time and an augury of Philosophic Good. “Ethical” idealism may be such corrective and supplement, as we have said, to those who yet regard it as “one of the immortal contributions” of Hegel to philosophy that he brought to men an altogether new sense of the power of thought or reason.

Professor Watson himself says, philosophy “is not reality, only the comprehension of what reality is. Thus Philosophy must “in its own way include the whole of possible ‘experience.’” But, if “ethical” idealism finds that parts of reality or experience—even the “volitional and moral and social aspects”—are not having justice done to them by “intellectual” Philosophy, why, in the name of reason, should it not have the right to protest? A really broad “intellectual” philosophy would not object, but freely allow it to cry aloud and spare not. For it knows that in the end truth must be gainer, and that, as Professor Watson professes, is the one end to be desired. When “ethical” idealism charges “intellectual” idealism “with destroying the self-activity of individual subjects and identifying Humanity with God” in virtue of its organic whole of thought, Professor Watson replies that the charge is “preposterous.” So it no doubt is, from the stand-point of thought and its “intelligible system”; but is there any reason why it may not be otherwise from the point of view of reality or experience? Granted that the individual is part of an organic whole, and ought to “comprehend in thought what the whole is,” there is yet no room or reason for the purely evasive mode in which “intellectual” idealism deals with what may be due to “the individual man” as not simply existing for the organic whole, but as at the same time having worth in himself and being at the same time an end in himself. There is thus a sense in which the individual is a whole as well as a part. There is certainly nothing “preposterous” in the “individual man,” as part of reality, crying out that very real sides of his nature are

being sacrificed by an abstract or "intellectual" philosophy on the shrine of "organic" metaphor. In the "intellectual" idealism represented by Professor Watson there are not the "I" with its tendencies and moods, on the one hand, and the External World as something given, on the other: the I and the World are not two elements with any sort of independent existence: they are two differences merely of a fundamental unity. That is to say, a real identity radiates through all plurality and difference. Our individuality becomes at length lost in the Whole; but, related as all things are in the universe as a system which is one and rational, we cannot consent to things being thus thrown into one homogeneous heap. Professor Watson speaks as though the categories of his "intellectual" system were real and concrete. Hegel said the real is the rational. We are more concerned to insist that the real is the individual. For the mystery of the individual and of things existent in time is nowise lightened for us in Hegelian idealism. The Universe is more and other to us than a mathematical theorem; 'tis a thing instinct with life and vital possibilities, which no setting forth of the formulas of Hegelian Logic can possibly exhaust. It is evident that personality—with all the mystery that encompasses the path of our personal responsibility—has here no justice done to it, is treated, in fact, pretty much as illusion. At most, it is the mere conjunction of thought and experience.

Having said so much by way of showing how far Professor Watson is from having made good his case against "ethical" idealism, we are now free to express some sense of the shortcomings of that type of idealism. Professor Watson has done well to point out the danger of minimizing thought, and the need to insist on saying of the world, as our great dramatist makes Ophelia say of the pansy, that "it's for thought." The universe must be intelligible to thought, for it is the revelation of reason,—the expression of rational thought. Nor do we like the way in which "ethical" idealism arrays the volitional and moral and social aspects of man's life against those of thought, as "things that take us further along the path of truth." No doubt, every ethical elevation takes us somewhat "along the path of truth," but does it effect this in separation from thought or knowledge or reason? There ought not to be the appearance of such separation, and, in the strength of the contrast it employs

between the two sets of elements "ethical" idealism is not happy. That idealism, as represented in the moralism of Professor A. Seth,—to whom Professor Watson refers,—is distinctly one-sided in so lifting the ethical impulse to obey out of relation to "intellectual" interest. Rather should "intellectual" interest give base and depth to moralism. In his insistence on our knowledge of the Absolute as a knowledge only "for us," Professor Seth presses his doctrine of relativity so strongly as to come perilously near making his Absolute an unknowable thing-in-itself.

There *is* a truth in the Hegelian contention that the ultimate reality of the universe is thought. That truth we have no right to forget because "the Hegelian Philosopher" erroneously makes that thought something abstract and dissociate from being, rather than the thought of the Infinite Personality whom men call God.

It seems, too, as though "ethical" idealism were not quite fortunate in its account of our knowledge of the Absolute. Professor Watson says it amounts to "a disguised scepticism," and he seems to think it treats the universe as "incomprehensible." We have much sympathy with what Professor Watson here urges, and the point is one of great importance. "No one denies," he says, "that the Absolute cannot be *completely* comprehended," but he holds it must not be urged that "it cannot be comprehended AT ALL as it is in itself," for this would be "the same as saying that there is for us no Absolute." Our knowledge of the Absolute must be held to be a real knowledge of the Absolute. Professor A. Seth is so anxious to maintain its relativity, that he makes us careful rather to press its reality. Knowledge, to be knowledge at all, must be no merely subjective thing, but the apprehension of reality. It can only be "for us," of course, but it is of the Absolute—the Absolute as it is. The Absolute is what it reveals itself as being, and is an infinite deal beyond all that is cognized or known, even by "the Hegelian Philosopher." The "ethical" philosopher must not, then, in his strongly antithetic way, contend that "the Truth is for God alone," for man has the Truth, and it is precisely the priceless possession of the truth that makes man what he is. Idealists, therefore, we must be content to remain in that the Universe is hidden from us by the veil of our ideas: before idealism of the

"intellectual" type defended by Professor Watson we may yet sceptically ask, as is done in "Faust":

"Is it mere THOUGHT evolves all nature's course?"

For speculative thought must take reality, not as it should be to the dialectical movement of "intellectual" or constructive thought; but, as it is empirically presented to it. This is where "intellectual" idealism fails. It remains in the region of the dialectics of the understanding and never gets the length of really concrete truth. It rests on what is merely *thought* and reaches not after what may be *cognized*. And the ethicist is right in insisting that the truth at which man arrives must not be held in unfruitful mode of the intellect alone, must be translated into action, that atrophy of his nature may not ensue. He is right in his contention that logical forms of argumentation must be made to fit in with the data of actual experience, the facts of real life. He is wrong only when he falters in following the sway of reason and the sweep of thought till these are really universal.

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#### SEXUAL EDUCATION FOR THE YOUNG.

CANON LYTTTELTON's thoughtful article in the July number of the JOURNAL on this important and difficult subject compels assent on many points, not only of his general contention but of his specific proposals. It will occur to some readers, however, that the admitted evils of an undirected curiosity and an unrestrained egoism in sexual matters among the young can be dealt with effectively only by more radical methods than he advocates. It is natural that the head-master of a public school should be inclined to accept our existing educational arrangements as part of the established order of things, and to confine his attention to lessening their incidental disadvantages, but it may be suggested that the greater part of the evils in question are due to the essential faults of an unnatural and pernicious system of upbringing. In the notes that are appended to another article in the same number,—*"Affection in Education,"* by Mr. E. Carpenter,—two points of consideration are raised that have a vital bearing on the problem. So long as we suffer the disruption of family life by the practice of sending children to boarding-schools, and so long as we shrink from the co-education of boys